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AB STRACT 
We investigate the extent to which possession of the veto 
allows the president to influence congressional decisions regarding 
regular annual appropriations legislation. The most important 
implication of our analysis is that the influence the veto conveys is 
asymmetrical: it allows the president to restrain Congress when he 
prefers to appropriate less to an agency than they do; it does not 
provide him an effective means of extracting higher appropriations from 
Congress when he prefers to spend more than they do. This asymmetry 
derives from Constitutional limitations on the veto, the sequencing of 
the appropriations process provided by the Budget and Accounting Act of 
1 920, and the presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure level 
contained in continuing resolutions (Fanno, 1966) . We find strong 
support for this proposition in a regression of presidential requests 
upon congressional appropriations decisions. 
PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE ON CONG RESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS DECISIONS'� 
D, Roderick Kiewiet and Math ew D. Mccubbins 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In seeking to influence policymaking within Congress, the president 
possesses impressive resources upon which to draw. There is th e prominence 
and prestige of the office itself, which confers upon the holder a unique 
vantage point from which to persuade others ( Neustadt, 1960) , A popular 
president is able to translate his standing with the public into 
congressional support for h is legislative program ( Edwards , 1980 ; Rivers and 
Rose , 1985) . Another, more tangible resource is the administrative 
machinery through which he can pursue h is interests on Capitol Hill--most 
notably the Office of Management and Budget ( Berman, 1979; Hecla, 1975, 
1984; Tompkins, 1985) , but also the congressional liaison office and 
lobbying operations ( Wayne , 1978, Sullivan, 1986) . 
The ultimate source of presidential influence, however, is the power 
vested by th e Constitution to veto bills passed by Congress. In this paper 
we investigate the extent to which possession of the veto allows the 
president to influence congressional decisions regarding regular annual 
appropriations legislation. We do so by developing a model that 
incorporates the key features of the annual funding process. The most 
important implication of our model is that the influence the veto conveys is 
asymmetrical: it allows the president to restrain Congress when he prefers 
to appropriate less to an agency than they do; it does not provide h im an 
effective means of extracting higher appropriations from Congress when he 
prefers to spend more than they do . 
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This asymmetry derives from three basic properties of th e 
legislative process. First, the veto provides the president with only the 
power to reject acts of Congress; it does not provide him with the power to 
modify these acts. Secondly , the sequence of actions in th e appropriations 
process, as specified in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1920 , provides 
Congress with a remarkable ability to set the agenda. Congress can act as a 
monopoly proposer submitting "take it or leave it" appropriations bills to 
the president. As in th e local budget referenda analyzed by Romer and 
Rosenthal ( 1978, 1979) , such agenda-setting ability confers upon the setter 
sustantial influence. 
Thirdly , the presence of a reversionary expenditure level in the 
appropriations process has important implications for the exercise of this 
agenda power. In principle, funding for agencies covered by annual 
appropriations reverts to z ero if legislation has not been enacted by the 
beginning of th e new fiscal year. Reversion to z ero, however, is rarely an 
attractive alternative. Standard procedure is for Congress to pass stopgap 
measures known as "continuing resolutions" in order to prevent disruptions 
in funding until regular appropriations legislation is forthcoming. 
Continuing resolutions customarily provide the minimum amount needed for 
existing programs, setting agency funding at the previous year' s level, or, 
if the House or Senate have passed a bill which appropriates fewer dollars 
than that, at th e new lower rate (Fenno, 1966) , Continuing resolutions, 
then, are predictable outcomes and can therefore be characteriz ed as de 
facto reversionary levels. We show that th e presence of this reversion 
level explains the asymmetry noted above. 
The existence of such an asymmetry yields several important 
empirical consequences, Above all, we expect to observe that the 
president's reque sts have much greater bearing upon agency budgets when he 
prefers to appropriate less than Congress than when he de sires to 
appropriate more. We find strong support for this hypothesis in a 
regression of presidential requests upon congressional appropriations 
decisions for 43 domestic agencies in the post-war period . We also test 
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some additional hypotheses about presidential influence which follow from an 
"electoral connection" perspective which has informed our previous rese arch 
on the appropriations process (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1985a, 1985b) . 
II. PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE ON CONGRESSIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
A Spatial Model of the Appropriations Process 
In analyzing the impact of a veto player ( the president) upon 
congressional appropriations decisions we employ the well-known spatial 
framework ( Black , 1958; Davis, Hinich , and Ordeshook 1970 , Enelow and 
Hinich , 1984) . The approach we take in modelling the appropriations process 
is similar to that taken recently by several scholars in their analysis of 
congressional procedures and institutional arrangements (Denzau and Mackay , 
1983 ; Fiorina and Noll, 1977; Krehbie l, 1985a, 1985b; Shepsle , 1979; Shepsle 
and Weingast, 1981, 1985) , As is the case with most of these previous 
efforts, the model we develop has elements which are highly stylized and 
abstract; it lacks much of the de tail and complexity of the appropriations 
process which previous studies h ave revealed (Fenno, 1966; Schick, 1980; 
Wildavsky , 1974) . We provide this abstract model in order to convey the 
basic logic of our analysis as simply and directly as possible. The 
assumptions we make derive from actual, concrete procedures and 
institutional arrangements governing the appropriations process, This 
allows us to derive propositions which can be subjected to empirical 
scrutiny . 
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For the most part our discussion will be based upon a single chamber 
legislature composed of three members choosing funding levels for a single 
agency along a single dimension. The legislature in our analysis can be 
viewed , alternatively, as an n member body, with the three members of 
interest being the median voter, the one-third quantile member and the two-
thirds quantile member. We also assume that the president and congressmen 
h ave complete information about e ach other' s  preferences and about the 
structure of the appropriations process. 
We further assume that the president and members of Congress are 
rational and self-interested.  The se t of feasible agency appropriations 
choices facing the president and members of Congress is X £'. IR • The 
preferences of the president and members of Congress over agency 
appropriations are assumed to be convex ( single-peaked in a one-dimensional 
issue space) . We define the president ' s  ideal appropriation for an agency 
to be P and a member of Congress ' s  ideal as Xi. Let >i represent member i' s 
preference relation; let >
P 
represe nt the president ' s  preference relation. 
Member i ' s  preferred-to se t is defined as Pi( x) = {x '  s X I x' > i x). Let 
P
P ( x) be the president ' s  preferred-to se t, which is defined in similar 
fashion. 
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For simplicity the three members of the legislature are referred to 
as members 1 ,  2, and 3, whose ideal appropriations for an agency are ordered 
such that x1 < x2 < x3, In a one-dimensional se tting, of course , a bill 
that proposes spending equal to x2 is the Condorce t winner and is not 
subject to defeat. In our three-person examples two members are needed to 
approve a bill and three to override a veto. 
The sequence of actions undertaken in the appropriations process, 
laid out in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1 920, is as follows. At the 
beginning of e ach se ssion the president transmits his budget requests to 
Congress. Congress then constructs appropriations bills that contain its 
choices of funding for each agency, Let b a X represent the funding level 
Congress adopts. If the president accepts this figure , then the 
congressional choice becomes law. If instead he casts a veto, then Congress 
faces another choice: it can override the president's  veto with a vote of 
two-thirds of the membership, thus enacting its previous choice b; or it can 
sustain the ve to, in which case the bill returns to Congress and the process 
is repeated. The process can be repeated until the beginning of the fiscal 
year for which funding is being considered. 
If no bill has passed by this time , funding for the agency reverts 
to the level spe cified by law. For most agencies governed by regular annual 
appropriations legislation, funding technically falls to zero if new 
appropriations are not enacted by the beginning of the new fiscal year, 
Treating zero as a mandated reversion level, however, is misleading, for at 
this j uncture Congress routinely passes stopgap funding bills of limited 
duration known as continuing resolutions. The funding level contained in a 
continuing resolution, which can be considered a reversionary level in the 
same se nse as in the well-known model of Romer and Rosenthal ( 1978, 1979) , 
we refer to as c e X.  Funding for an agency remains at c until such time 
agreement is reached and new appropriations legislation is enacted and 
signed .  
As indicated earlier, we assume that there is no uncertainty 
hindering the choices of participants in the appropriations process. 
Consequently the outcome of the process in the final round of play--the end 
of the fiscal year--is known beforehand to everyone involved . Without loss 
of generality , then, the repeat-play appropriations process can be modelled 
as a single play, 
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In the last stage of this process, Congress offers the president a 
"take it or leave it" appropriations bill, b, If he accepts the bill the 
outcome will be b, If he vetoes the bill the outcome will still be b if his 
veto is overridden. In the event his veto is sustained , he knows that 
Congress will enact a continuing resolution calling for a spending rate c. 
Barring other political considerations ( more on that later) , the president 
will veto the congressional bill b only if he prefers c to b, i . e . , only if 
b t P
P
( c) , Moreover, the president cannot use the threat of a ve to to 
induce a more favorable outcome unless b t P
P
( c) , as he cannot credibly 
threaten to do something which makes him worse. off ( Schelling, 1 960) . 
The president ' s  choice to accept or veto appropriations legislation 
is therefore conditioned on the nature of the continuing resolution, Since 
the appropriations level chosen by Congress is in turn conditioned on an 
assessment of the president ' s  actions and on whether or not a veto is 
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sustainable , the bills passed by Congress are also conditioned on the nature 
of continuing resolutions. 
Continuing Resolutions 
It is rarely the case that all regular annual appropriations bills 
are enacted by the beginning of the fiscal year to which they pertain. 
Indeed, in recent years it has been unusual for any appropriations to be 
enacted before the beginning of the fiscal year ( Bach , 1 985) . This h appens 
either when the president and Congress fail to reach an agreement, or when 
Congress itse lf does not finish action on a bill. 
According to Fenno ( 1 966) , the House Appropriations Committee, when 
drafting these resolutions, faithfully adheres to the formula of se tting 
spending for the agencies affected at a rate which is consistent with the 
lowest of the following three figures: the previous fiscal year ' s  
appropriations; the House bill, i f  one has been passed; or the Senate bill, 
if one has been passed, Henceforth we refer to this formula as the "Fanno 
Rule ," We assume th at this formula will be adhered to in the construction 
of continuing resolutions. Thus the president and members of Congress know 
with certainty th at the spending resulting from a continuing resolution c is 
the minimum of the congressional bill or last year's appropriations. 
That continuing resolutions are based on the Fenno Rule is an 
assumption which plays a key role in our mode l, Though we believe that the 
continuing resolution process should at some point be modelled as an 
endogenous part of the appropriations process, we h ave several reasons to 
believe that it is realistic to treat it as exogenous, First, it has been 
adopted with a high degree of regularity for over a century , Second , there 
are strong organizational imperatives which dictate a commitment to the 
Fenno Rule , or at least to some automatic mechanism which performs the 
function of th is rule . 
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At first glance adherence to the Fenno Rule seems somewhat 
remarkable . That continuing resolutions take th is form is not mandated by 
the Constitution, the Rules of the House , the bylaws of the Appropriations 
Committee , or anything else . They are simply acts of Congress, and in 
principle could , like any ordinary appropriations bill, specify spending at 
any level Congress and the president might agree upon. Why, then, does 
Congress consistently adhere to the Fanno Rule? This is especially 
surprising given that the de Jure reversion of agency appropriations to zero 
potentially confers to the author of appropriations legislation--the 
Appropriations Committee--a tremendous degree of agenda control. The 
Committee could use its amendment restriction powers to present Congress and 
the president with a wide range of appropriations which both would find 
preferable to the wholesale closing down of agency activity . 
This strategy works, however, only if the members of the Committee 
were truly willing to live with zero, which is what would result if their 
bluff were called . But this is rarely the case , In general, the threat of 
allowing agency funding to lapse to zero possesses the same problem as other 
threats of drastic action�they are not credible, since carrying them out 
would make the threatener worse off, Conversely, if membership on the 
Appropriations Committee was skewed enough to make zero a credible threat, 
the other members of Congress would find this extortion intolerable . Severe 
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sanctions can be applied (and indeed have been applied) a gainst committees 
which too freque ntly abuse their powers (Brady and Morgan, 1986) . The Fenno 
Rule is a solution to a game between the membership and its committees: it 
provides individual membe rs (and the president ) with an insurance policy 
against extortion by the Commit tee . Strict adhe rence to the Fenno Rule can 
thus be seen as another manifestation of the universalism which 
characterizes allocative decisions made by Congress, a norm which is 
consistent with the long-term interests of individual congressmen (Arnold, 
197 9; Weingast , 1979) . 
Secondly, as was pointed out to us by a senior staff member on the 
House Appropriations Committee, there is a bureaucratic imperative in the 
choice of the lowest appropriations that might obtain in the upcoming fiscal 
year. Choosing any higher level risks committing funds and h iring pe rsonnel 
for activities that might have to be te rminated as soon as a regular 
appropriations bill is passe d .  This would not only waste money, but might 
also run afoul of civil se rv ice regulations that make it d ifficult for the 
federal government to lay-off employees.  Congressmen do not want 
bureaucratic rigidities to look them into programs which h ave not yet been 
funded in a regular bill. Continuing resolutions of the form noted by Fenno 
th us win virtually automatic support , and are in all likelihood veto-proof. 1 
Congress has appeared t o  depart occasionally from the Fenno Rule by 
permitting spending in continuing resolutions at levels above that of the 
previous fiscal year (Schick, 1980) , Although enacted under the rubric of a 
continuing resolution, these bills were tantamount to omnibus appropriations 
bills; they were specified to remain in effect for the duration of the 
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fiscal year, and a re not the stopgap measures to which we refer.  This is 
not to say that departures from the Fenno Rule in bona fide continuing 
resolutions never occur. Deviations, however, tend to be more conservative 
than the Rule itself. In the first continuing resolution for fiscal 1982, 
for example, the Depa rtment of Defense was permit ted to spend at the lower 
of the administration ' s  budge t request or the fiscal 1981 level (Donnelly, 
1981) . 
Presidential Influence and the Veto 
In analyz ing the influence conferred upon the president th rough the 
threat or use of h is veto, there are only two case s which need to be 
considered: (1) the president ' s  ideal appropriation is greater than the 
ideal of the median member of Congress, i. e . ,  P > X 2; (2) the president's
ideal appropriation is less than the median in Congress, i. e . ,  P < x2• 
Case 1: Since P > x2, the president prefers the congressional median t o  a 
continuing resolution, i . e . , if P > x2, then x2 e PP (c) . When P > x2
, as in 
Figure 1, a proposal of x2 is unbeatable and becomes the legislative choice , 
i. e. , b = x2• The president will be faced with a choice of accepting b, or 
vetoing the bill and getting either b (if his ve to is overridden )  or o (if 
the veto is sustained ) .  Since he prefers x2 to o, he cannot make h imself
be t ter off by vetoing, so he would never veto a bill that proposes b = x2 if
he prefers at least as much as x2• Thus, Congress adopts b = x2 without
regard to the president ' s  veto authority. The president cannot affect the 
appropriations outcome with the use of h is veto when he prefers to spend at 
least as much as the median in Congress. 2 
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[Figure 1 about here]. 
Case 1: P < x2• The president may still prefer x2 to c (especially if P is 
close to X2>. Here, as in Case 1, he cannot af fect the congressional 
choice. If, on the other hand, the president prefers a continuing 
resolution to the congressional median, i,e., x2 t PP(c), then he may have 
some leverage. If Congress passes b = x; the president will veto it. If 
member 1 prefers x2 to c, then the president's �eto will be overridden and 
the final outcome is b = x2, and again the president will have no influence 
(through the use of his veto) on the appropriations decision. If, on the 
other hand, X2 t P1(c), as in Figure 2, then the president's veto will be 
sustained. Knowing this, a bill b = z, such that z < x2, will be proposed 
that makes the president indifferent between z and c (i.e., z e PP(c)), The 
choice of b = z is preferred by members 2 and 3 to any other alternative in 
PP(c). Thus b = z is a structure-induced Condorcet winner (Shepsle, 1979). 
The president is able, through possession of the veto, to cause Congress to 
reduce its spending from x2 to z. 
It is also apparent from Figure 2 that the president's ability to 
cause a reduction in spending is limited, since no bill calling for spending 
less than y will be proposed, as y is the point of indifference with respect 
to c for member 1. If z < y, then y is a "structure-induced" Condoroe t 
winner that is unanimously preferred by the members of Congress to the 
result of a continuing resolution o, Thus any veto of a bill b = y will be 
overridden. Knowing this, the president does not veto b = y (though he 
vetoes any bill with spending greater than y). In this situation the threat 
of a veto causes Congress to adopt appropriations y lower than it would 
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otherwise have adopted (i.e., X2), 
[Figure 2 about here], 
Although the de facto reversionary point in the appropriations 
process is defined by the Fenno Rule, our analysis does not require 
adherence to this particular formula. As long as c < X2, influence conveyed 
to the president by the veto is confined to instances when P < x2•
3 What is 
important, however, is that the Fenno Rule imparts predictability to the 
appropriations process; everyone knows what the outcome is if no 
appropriations legislation is enacted. 
In Figures 1 and 2 the level of spending contained in a continuing 
resolution is less than the ideal appropriation preferred by the president 
and by members of the legislature, i.e., c < P and c < x1 
way, however, do our results hinge upon the location of the continuing 
resolution relative to the president's or members' ideals, To show this we 
examine two extreme oases: (1) when the ideal of the median in Congress is 
zero; (2) when the ideal of the president is zero. If x2 = O, then P 2 x2, 
and b = O. In such circumstances, as in Case 1, the president has no 
influence on the. appropriations choice, On the other hand, if P = 0 (and x1 
> 0) , the president may possess some influence. As in Case 2, member 1 is 
the pivotal player. A bill, b = y > O, is preferred by member 1 to zero, 
Since b = y will then be enacted irrespective of presidential action (any 
veto will be overridden), the president will go along· with b = y. Thus, we 
again derive our asymmetric influence hypothesis. 
A straightforward implication of our model is that the president 
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vetoes appropriations bills only when he prefers lower spending than that 
adopted by Congress. If he prefers more, the veto cannot make him better 
off, and so we do not expect him to use it. This expectation is strongly 
borne out in the historical record. Of the eighteen appropriations bills 
vetoed from 1 9 4 8  to 1 979 , the president never vetoed one because it called 
for too little spending. All contained either appropriations greater than 
the president requested, or language that he found objectionable, e.g., the 
rider to a 1 973 supplemental appropriation which prohibited bombing of Laos 
and Cambodia, An apparent exception was Carter's veto of the 1 978 public 
works bill, which specified lower overall expenditures than he had 
requested, In his veto message, however, Carter asserted that new starts on 
dozens of wasteful projects would commit the federal government to more 
spending in the long run than he was willing to countenance. 
The President's Request 
It is important for our empirical analysis to consider whether the 
president has an incentive to misrepresent his preferences in the requests 
he submits to Congress, For this purpose we relax momentarily our full 
information assumption, and assume that members of Congress do not know the 
president's ideal. If he prefers higher spending than Congress, as in 
Figure 1 ,  misrepresentation of his ideal upward gains him nothing, as they 
still choose x2• If he were capable of misrepresenting his ideal downward 
to a point below the congressional median, on the other hand, he may be able 
to affect the congressional choice, But this would yield spending that is 
even lower than the congressional median x2, thus making the president even 
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worse off, 
If the president prefers less than Congress, on the other hand, 
there is a region wherein misrepresentation may benefit the president. If 
he is indifferent between z and c, as in Figure 2, and the members of 
Congress know this, they choose b = z (as this makes members 2 and 3 better 
off than any other choice). If z is less than y, where member 1 is 
indifferent between c and y, then b = y is chosen. Getting Congress to 
believe that he prefers more than P by misrepresenting his preferences 
upward causes them to adopt an even higher amount, again making the 
president worse off, But if he can make Congress believe he prefers less 
than P (and thus that his point of indifference z is also lower), he can 
induce them to choose b 
= 
y. Since y is closer than z to P, he would be 
better off, In this situation the president therefore has an incentive to 
misrepresent his preferences to Congress. 
Two additional considerations, however, strongly discourage a 
nonsincere strategy. First, the only situation in which the president has 
an incentive to misrepresent his ideal is when he prefers less than 
Congress, and then only in a downward direction. Knowing this, Congress may 
learn over time how to exactly invert the president's requests to discover 
his ideal. Second, as Denzau, Riker, and Shepsle ( 1985) have argued, the 
ability to misrepresent in the legislative process is limited by electoral 
considerations. Voters are not likely to appreciate complicated strategies 
that entail misrepresentation. In misrepresenting, the president must weigh 
the loss in votes due to misunderstanding against the gain in votes brought 
about by achieving a better outcome. For these reasons we expect that the 
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president's budget requests to Congress truthfully reveal his preferences. 
To the extent our model has virtue in its simplicity, its vice is 
that we cannot incorporate the full richness of appropriations politics into 
our analysis. As acknowledged earlier, the president possesses resources 
other than the veto with which to affect appropriations decisions: his 
ability to move public opinion, his access to national party resources, his 
campaigning ability, and his ability to grant (or withhold) favors are only 
some of the most important. These resources may provide him leverage even 
in oases where the veto�� confers him none. But, we expect an 
asymmetry of influence to persist in the face of these other factors; 
holding all else constant, the president still has more influence when he 
prefers to spend less than Congress rather than more. 
Another potential problem arising from the simplifying assumptions 
we make is that Congress, by bundling appropriations for the hundreds of 
government agencies into a small number of appropriations bills, might 
reduce presidential influence over them, It is not self-evident that this 
is the case, as the current controversy over the "line-item" veto attests 
(see Mackay and Weaver, 1985) . Similarly, in a multidimensional setting 
the president might be able to barter his influence on one dimension to gain 
a more favorable outcome on another, e.g. , agreeing not to veto a big 
increase favored by Congress for one agency in return for appropriations 
higher than the congressional median for another. Trades of this nature 
obviously work to undermine our major hypotheses. 
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Finally, we do not model the continuing resolution process, We 
argue that the assumption that continuing resolutions adhere to the Fenno 
Rule is a reasonable and realistic one. If the continuing resolution 
process produces unstable and therefore unpredictable outcomes the analysis 
we present would be jeopardized. On these cautionary notes, then, we turn 
to the task of determining just how much empirical support our major 
hypotheses are able to garner. 
III. CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS AND THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 
The most important proposition derived from our model is that the 
president is able to exert substantially more influence upon congressional 
decisions when he prefers to appropriate less to an agency than Congress 
rather than more. So far, however, our theory has been couched in terms of 
ideal points. Even though we have argued that the president will not 
misrepresent his preferences, the problem of not observing members' ideal 
points still remains. Fortunately, we are able to infer, from the 
president's requests and final agency appropriations passed by Congress and 
signed by the president, which branch truly prefers lower spending, and thus 
which enjoys a strategic advantage. First, if the president's request (as 
submitted by the Office of Management and Budget) for agency i in year t, 
ESTit' is greater than the final agency appropriations, APPit' we conclude 
that the president did not influence the choice of APPit' That is, ESTit > 
APPit implies P > x2• 
The easiest way to see that this is true is to first suppose that it 
is false, i.e., that EST it > APP it' but P < x2• -As we have shown, the bill 
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passed by Congress, b, must always be greater than or equal to P when P < x2 
(b equals x2, z, or y in Figure 2). This implies that b 2 P, thus APPit = b 
L ESTit P. This is a contradiction, so it must be the case that P > x2 if 
EST!t > APP!t' 
On the other hand, if ESTit < APPit then P < x2, meaning that the 
president may have exercised some influence on the final appropriations 
APPit' As before, first suppose that this is false, i.e. , ESTit < APPit' 
but P X2• If P > x2, then b = x2 (as in Case 1). This implies that ESTit 
P b APPit' This is also a contradiction, so it must be the case that 
P < X2 if ESTit < APPit' This proves that we can use observed data, ESTit 
and APPit• to determine if the president has some influence through 
possession of the veto. 
A direct test of our hypothesis would be very simple. If the 
president preferred more appropriations for an agency than Congress, the 
bill passed would be identical to the congressional median, i.e. , 
IX2 - bl = o. If he preferred less, however, he might be able to pull 
appropriations downward, and so lx2 - b f > o. Such a test, however, is 
precluded by our inability to observe the median member's ideal point x2• 
Nevertheless, the observable data do allow alternative methods of testing 
the asymmetric influence hypothesis. First, when the president is in a 
strategically advantageous position (ESTit � APPit), the requests for 
appropriations he submits to Congress should have much greater bearing upon 
the amount of appropriations an agency ultimately receives than when his 
position is weak. Assuming some estimation problems can be solved (more on 
that shortly), regressing final appropriations figures upon the president's 
requests in the two strategic situations allows us to test this hypothesis 
by comparing the two coefficients which are thereby estimated. 
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Secondly, we also know something about the nature of congressional 
spending preferences, in that we have shown in previous work (Kiewiet and 
Mccubbins, 198Sa, 198Sb) that members' preferences are determined, at the 
margin, by several political and economic variables. This knowledge enables 
us to construct additional tests of our asymmetry hypothesis. Because 
congressional preferences have less influence on the final appropriations 
APPit when the president holds a strategic advantage, these political and 
economic variables should also have less influence upon agency 
appropriations. We test these hypotheses jointly. 
Political and Economic Determinants of Congressional Preferences 
Adopting the "electoral connection" perspective of Mayhew (1974), we 
assume that the decisions congressmen (and the president) make concerning 
appropriations result from their desire for reelection, Funds appropriated 
to agencies of the federal government serve this goal by buying goods and 
services that benefit their constituents. Constituents in turn condition 
their support for members and the president, at least in part, upon their 
degree of satisfaction with these benefits and the coats of providing them, 
We expect appropriations for any given program to yield declining marginal 
returns in electoral support. To maximize their reelection prospects, then, 
members seek s pending levels that equate marginal returns in electoral 
support from spending on programs to the marginal losses in support 
resulting from higher budgets. 
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We have employed this electoral calculus in our earlier work on 
appropriations decisions (Kiewiet and Mccubbins, 1985a, 1985b; McCubbins and 
Schwartz, 1985). In these studies we identified several political and 
economic variables that affect congressional appropriations at the margin. 
First, given that the electoral fates of congressmen depend, at least in 
part, upon the state of the economy (Kramer, 1971; Jacobson and Kernell, 
1981), our approach predicts that appropriations decisions respond to major 
economic influences such as inflation and unemployment. The results of our 
resemble other districts which have Republican representatives, the 
reelection constituencies of Democratic and Republican congressmen do 
reliably differ (Fiorina, 1974; Fenno, 1978; Poole and Rosenthal, 1983). 
The tendency for Democrats to support more spending for domestic programs 
can be attributed, at least in part, to differences between Democratic and 
Republican constituencies. 
IV. DATA AND ESTIMATION 
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previous analyses indicate that Congress acts in accord with the Keynesian The data we compiled in order to test the asymmetric influence 
prescription of increased spending as a remedy for unemployment and 
decreased spending for inflation. Secondly, it follows from the assumption 
that voters discount past benefits and future costs that Congress tends to 
"heap" policy benefits late in the electoral calendar, creating an 
"electoral-appropriations" cycle. This too was borne out, as our findings 
indicated that Congress treats agency spending requests more generously in 
election years than in nonelection years. 
Finally, we found that appropriations decisions also reflected the 
propensity of Democrats to prefer more government spending in the domestic 
realm than Republicans; the higher the percentage of Democrats in Congress, 
the faster agency budgets tended to grow. To some, the presence of party 
differences might seem contrary to the spirit of an electoral connection 
model; "party" and "constituency" have traditionally been viewed as 
alternative, often contradictory sources of influence upon legislators. 
Party and constituency pressures, however, coincide far more often than not. 
Even though the congressional districts represented by Democrats often 
hypothesis were the presidential funding requests (submitted to Congress in 
the form of OMB budget estimates) and the final appropriations figures for 
43 federal agencies from fiscal 1948 to 1979 (see Appendix A for data 
sources). These agencies are listed in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Most of these agencies were in Fenno's (1966) sample. The 
additional agencies were either public works agencies, which we have 
examined in some detail elsewhere (Kiewiet and MoCubbins, 1985b), or 
regulatory agencies. These 43 represent a large sample of important 
domestic agencies that are funded through regular appropriations acts. 
The regression framework we adopted was the "switching regime" model 
(Madalla, 1977) • This technique enables us to estimate separate 
coef ficients for our variables in the two different strategic situations. 
The basic form of the equation to be estimated is as follows: 
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(1) 
c1 and c2 = constant terms. 
r1 = a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 when ESTit � APPit' thus 
indexing the regime in which the president is in a strategically 
favorable position. 4 
r2 = a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 when ESTit>APPit' thus 
indexing the regime in which the president is in a strategically weak 
position. 
the appropriations awarded by Congress to agency i in fiscal year t. 
the appropriations requested by the president (in the form of the 
OMB estimate) for agency i in fiscal year t. 
DEMt = the percentage of seats on the House Appropriations Committee held by 
Democrats. 
Et= 1 during election years (the second session of each Congress), 0 
otherwise. Appropriations decisions concern the upcoming fiscal year, so 
appropriations considered by Congress during election years are for odd-
numbered fiscal years. 
Ut-l = the average rate of unemployment during the first six months of the 
session of Congress in which appropriations for a given fiscal year are 
considered.5 
It-l = the (annualized) percent change in the Consumer Price Index during 
the first six months of the session of Congress in which appropriations 
for a given fiscal year are considered. 
eit = an error term subsuming all unmeasured factors. 
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Equation 1 specifies congressional appropriations decisions as a 
function of presidential requests and several other variables. We expected 
the errors produced in predicting congressional decisions to be correlated 
with the president's requests. It was therefore necessary to model ESTit as 
an endogenous variable, and employ an instrumental variables technique.6 
Our most serious estimation problem, however, stems from 
specification of the regime dummies, r1 and y2• The value of the regime 
dummies, of course, depends upon whether ESTit < APPit' The problem is that 
ESTit and APPit are endogenous, which implies in turn that the regime 
dummies are endogenous (Madalla, 1 977). Consequently, an initial 
instrumental variables procedure on the regime dummies is required if 
consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates are to be obtained. In 
the procedure we adopted, r1 and r2 were replaced by probability estimates 
derived from an instrumental logit regression of r1 (y2 = 1 - y1) on all the 
exogenous variables in our equation (see Appendix B for details). 
An unfortunate feature of our data is the small number of 
observations for each agency; the full time series is only 3 2 years long, 
and for some agencies there are many fewer observations than that. Pooling 
data across the 43 agencies in the sample is thus an attractive option. 
Besides offering a gain in statistical leverage, it simplifies the test of 
our hypothesis: only a single test statistic need be calculated in order to 
test our hypothesis of asymmetric influence. 
One risk associated with pooling is the possibility of cross-
sectional correlation which may downwardly bias our estimates of the 
standard errors. However, an examination of the covariances of the error 
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terms generated in estimation of Equation 1 between all pairs of agencies 
showed only a few were significant, There was some suggestion that the 
errors were correlated, to a mild extent, across programs in the Department 
of Interior Bill and across independent regulatory agencies, By not taking 
account of the covariation across programs in these bills our estimates are 
likely to be somewhat inefficient, though only mildly so, Corrections, 
however, are made complicated by the endogenous switching model we employed, 
Pooling cross-sections can also introduce heteroscedastic error 
variances, again resulting in inefficient estimates, A battery of test 
statistics on the residuals produced in estimating Equation 1 suggested that 
there was indeed a significant degree of heteroscedasticity resulting 
primarily from large differences in the magnitudes of agency appropriations 
figures, 
We chose to correct this problem by dividing OMB estimates and final 
appropriations figures by the appropriations figures for the preceding 
fiscal year, and then taking the log of this ratio, This transformation 
results in figures which are similar to percentage changes, but which are 
more symmetric about 1,00, This is important, given the distortions which 
are present with percentage changes; moving from 100 to 300, for example, is 
a 300 percent increase, while moving from 300 to 100 is only a 66 percent 
decrease. The same battery of tests showed that the heteroscedasticity 
problem was dramatically reduced, but not entirely eliminated. No other 
technique--generalized least squares, deflators, nor a standard logistic 
transformation--did better in reducing heteroscedasticity than did the 
transformation we employed. We suspect that the remaining 
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heteroscedasticity is a result of our endogenous switching, and therefore no 
common transformation would solve the problem, Further, the degree of 
heteroscedasticity is very minor and should not produce too much 
inefficiency in our estimates, Whatever the case, our substantive results 
were robust to the transformation used. 
Lastly, additional tests on the errors produced in estimating 
Equation 1 show that our results were not compromised by implicit linear 
restrictions resulting from pooling, serial correlation, or omitted 
variables colinear with our included variables, Results of these tests are 
available upon request. 
V, RESULTS 
We have hypothesized that the president has much greater influence 
on congressional appropriations decisions when he prefers to spend less than 
Congress rather than more. In estimating Equation 1 we thus predict p11 > 
P21• We also expect the. political and economic determinants of 
congressional preferences to have a much larger influence upon agency 
appropriations when Congress is in a strategically favorable position. 
Thus, we expect P22 > p12, p23 > p13, p24 > p14, and p25 > p15• We test 
these hypotheses jointly, 
In order to facilitate interpretation of the other coefficients, the 
unemployment, inflation, and partisan composition variables entered the 
) equations as deviations from their mean values during this period. Results 
are reported in Table 2, Superscripts 1 and 2 denote the regime: 1 if 
ESTit � APPit; 
2 if ESTit ) APPit' 
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[Table 2 about here] 
The results reported in Table 2 provide strong support for our 
hypotheses. The estimated effect of the president's (OMB) request upon the 
final appropriations figure was much larger when the president was in a 
strategically favorable position than when he was not. The large difference 
between the two EST coefficients was significant at the . 01 level, 
Similarly, the percentage of Democrats appeared to matter only when it was 
the Congress who held the upper hand; the .197 coefficient indicates that a 
ten percent increase in the number of Democrats would produce about a two 
percent gain, ceteris paribus, in appropriations for the agencies in our 
sample. The coefficient for the DEM� term, in contrast, was virtually 
zero. 7 Election years followed the same pattern; while election year 
"spending moods" appeared to have garnered these agencies about three 
percent more than in off years when the strategic situation favored 
Congress, they benefited very little when congressional action was 
constrained by the preferences of the president. Unemployment appears to 
have mattered little in determining congressional preferences in situations 
when the president possessed some influence over the budget choice, though 
it was a significant factor when Congress was in a strategically 
advantageous position. By contrast, the coefficients for inflation were 
insignificant in both regimes. Our results thus support our joint 
hypothesis on these coefficients. 
Strictly speaking, our model implies that p21 = o, i.e. , the 
president has no influence at all when in a strategically weak position. 
The estimated coefficient, however, was . 461 and significant, indicating 
that the president possesses some influence even in cases whe� he prefers 
more than the congressional choice. As discussed earlier, there are many 
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potential sources of influence over and above that provided by the veto. 
Influence may arise through the exercise of informal powers, or may reflect 
the fact that appropriations are passed not as line items, but as a small 
number of appropriations bills. Our results, however, allow us only to 
speculate as to the mix of factors involved. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
Partisan Implications: Are Republicans Stronger Presidents? 
The results reported in Table 2 reveal that presidential requests 
have much more influence upon final appropriations figures when the 
president desires to spend less than Congress than when he would rather 
spend more. The general tendency for Democratic presidents to favor higher 
levels of domestic spending than Republicans implies that, in this arena at 
least, Republicans tend to be "stronger" presidents. Figure 3 ,  which for 
each fiscal year plots the percentage of cases from our sample in whichthe 
president was favored by his proximity to the reversionary expenditure, 
suggests that this is so. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Although our time series ends a few years prior to the beginning of 
the Reagan Administration, budgetary trends since 1981 are entirely 
consistent with the implications of our model. Armed with a credible veto 
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threat, President Reagan has enjoyed a large measure of success in 
restraining expenditures for nonentitlement domestic programs. Our model 
also implies, however, that his desire for large increases in defense 
spending grants Congress the strategic advantage in this area. If so, the 
rate of defense spending growth over the past four years has been more a 
function of congressional preferences than of the preferences of Ronald 
Reagan or Caspar Weinberger. This would seem to be the case, After 
granting almost all of the 26% increase the Administration sought for fiscal 
1982, the amounts appropriated by Congress have fallen farther and farther 
below the Administration's requests. In response to the request for a 17% 
increase in defense spending for fiscal 1986, Congress enacted an increase 
of 1%. 
Implications for the Study of Presidential Vetoes 
In recent years, several time series analyses have attempted to 
account for the frequency with which different presidents cast vetoes, as 
well as for the frequency of successful and unsuccessful override attempts 
(Copeland, 1983; Rohde and Simon, 1985; Hoff, 1985) , These variables have 
been modelled as depending upon the major parties' shares in Congress, 
stages of the eleotoral cycle, the state of the economy, and other exogenous 
variables, The evidence yielded by these studies is valuable but limited, 
for it is not necessary for the president to actually exercise the veto in 
order to influence legislation. As indicated above, the threat of a veto, 
if credible, will induce Congress to incorporate the president's preferences 
into legislation as it is pending. Indeed, in this study, the influence 
wielded by the president, by virtue of the veto option, was measured in 
appropriations legislation which the president did not veto, but rather 
signed into law. To the extent that the president and members of Congress 
have full information there should never be any vetoes. 
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This suggests that vetoes occur mainly as a consequence of 
position-taking. Congress may invite a veto by passing legislation, knowing 
beforehand that the president will veto it, in order to take a position on 
some issue, Indeed, in appropriations legislation vetoes rarely come as a 
surprise; presidents almost always warn Congress that a veto is forthcoming, 
Similarly, the president may veto a bill in the face of a congressional 
override in order to take a position. - In any event, the reasons we expect a 
veto or an override are different from those generally studied in the 
literature. Analyzing presidential influence as a function of the 
credibility of a veto threat yields a richer, more comprehensive view of 
what possession of the veto means to the president. 
29 
APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES 
Presidential budget requests (in the form of OMB estimates) and final 
appropriations figures are reported in the Annual Senate Document 
Appropriations, Budget Estimates, Etc. , the section entitled "Itemized 
Comparisons of Budget Estimates and Appropriations Arranged by Senate Acts. " 
Both sets of figures were reported in various regular annual appropriations 
acts. In a few instances several line items which customarily appeared 
under an agency in the regular annual appropriations act did not, but 
appeared instead in a subsequent supplemental act. In these cases these 
appropriations were counted toward the agency's funding for that year. In 
all other cases the funds appropriated in deficiency and supplemental acts 
were for line items already covered in the regular annual act. These 
figures were almost always very small, and were not included in the 
following analyses. 
Unemployment and Consumer Price Index figures were taken from issues of the 
Monthly Labor Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. 
Information on presidential vetoes of appropriations bills was taken from 
Presidential Vetoes, 1789-1976, Office of the Secretary of the Senate, and 
from the 1977-79 issues of the Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 
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APPENDIX B: NONLINEAR FIRST- STAGE ESTIMATION OF REGIMES 
In Equation 1 the coefficients of the right-hand side variables are 
allowed to vary across the two strategic "regimes": r1 = 1 when 
EStit � APPit; r2 = 1 - r1 = 1 when EStit > APPit' The exogenous variables 
in Equation 1 affect the regime probabilities as well as the value of APPit' 
If more Democrats on the House Appropriations Committee cause higher 
appropriations, for example, they will also increase the probability that 
Congress prefers to appropriate more than the president, and thus that 
r1 = 1. This can lead to biased and inefficient estimates. 
Dubin (1985) shows that one solution to this problem is to replace 
the regime dummies (which take on values of only 1 or 0) , with unbiased 
probability estimates of their values. These can be derived from a 
nonlinear regression of r1 on all the exogenous variables in Equatio� 1, 
including those in the instrumental variables list for ESTit' These 
additional variables, as noted in Footnote 4, were as follows: 
ui-1 the unemployment rate during the previous six months prior to the 
president's submission of budget requests to Congress. 
the inflation rate during the previous six months prior to the 
president's submission of budget requests to Congress. 
DEMi = a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the president is a 
Democrat, O otherwise. 
E� a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 in presidential election 
years, 0 otherwise. 
K = a dummy variable for appropriations considered during the Korean War 
years (fiscal 1952-54). 
VN = a dummy variable for appropriations considered during the American 
combat presence in the Vietnam War (fiscal 1967-74), 
The logit equation also specified several dummy variables to reflect the 
particular appropriations bill in which the agency was included. This was 
done primarily to improve goodness of fit. 
Results of this logit estimation are reported in Table 3 .  The 
strongest effects are those associated with partisanship. Compared to 
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Republicans, Democratic presidents were likely to prefer more spending than 
Congress, putting them at a strategic disadvantage, Conversely, more 
Democrats on the House Appropriations Committee made Congress more likely to 
prefer higher appropriations than the president, thus putting him at a 
strategic advantage. 
The replacement of r1 and r2 with unbiased probability estimates 
also alleviates censoring problems in our data (Madalla, 1 977). Censoring 
arises from a data partition created by our regime dummies: in regime 1 ,  
all observations o f  ESTit are less than or equal to the dependent variable 
APPit' while all observations of ESTit in regime 2 are greater than the 
corresponding value of APPit' Our hypothesis that p11 > p21 would thus 
appear to be guaranteed (artifactually) by this partition. We do not 
partition the data, however, since we use an unbiased likelihood estimate of 
the probability that the president holds some influence to weight all 
observations, Our logit estimation (described in Appendix B) yields the 
probability (between O and 1) that an observation falls into one partition 
(regime) or the other. Further, this inequality would not necessarily hold 
as long as constant terms are specified in the equation. 
Table 1 Sample of Federal Agencies, FY1948-79 a 
Extension Service Bureau of Standards (1948-73) 
Patent Office 
Weather Bureau (1948-66) 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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Farmers Home Administration 
Rural Electrification Admin. 
Soil Conservation Service 
Forest Service 
Bureau of Land Management 
National Park Service 
Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Bureau of Labor Standards (1948-68) 
Census Bureau 
Fish � Wildlife Service (1948-71) 
Bureau of Mines (1948-74) 
Bonneville Power Admin. (1949-75) 
Office of Education 
Public Health Service (1948-69) 
Office of Voe. Rehab. (1948-68) 
Bureau of Reclamation 
Corps of Engineers 
Military Construction (1960-79) 
Economic Dev. Admin. (1966-79) 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Federal Trade Commission 
Geological Survey 
NASA (1960-79) 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Imm, and Naturalization Service 
Federal Prison System 
Bureau of Narcotics (1948-69) 
Bureau of Customs 
Bureau of the Public Debt 
Secret Service 
Internal Revenue Service 
Bureau of the Mint 
Food and Drug Administration 
Civil Aeronautics Board 
Federal Power Commission 
Interstate Commerce Commission 
Federal Communications Commission 
Coast � Geodetic Survey (1948-66) 
a Most agencies in this sample existed continuously from FY1948 
through FY1979. If they did not, the years in which they were in 
existence are reported, 
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Table 2 Presidential Influence in the Congressional Appropriations 
Process, FY1948-79 (Instrumental Variables Estimates) 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t Ratio 
c t 
1 ,058 ,025 2.31 
c t 2 -.011 .014 -0,83 
EST1 t it 1.01 .210 4.81 
EST2 t it .461 ,091 5.10 
DEM1 t .008 .169 0,05 
DEM2 t .197 .071 2.78 
El t -.016 .016 0.97 
E2 t ,034 ,009 3 .51 
1 It-1 .003 ,003 0.98 
2 It-1 .001 .002 0,55 
1 
0t-1 -,004 ,006 0.69 
2 
0t-1 ,017 ,005 3.70 
n 
= 
1230 
t Endogenous Variable 
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Table 3 Nonlinear (Logit) Estimates of Endogenous Switching Regime 
Dummies (Maximum Likelihood Estimates) 
Variable* Estimate Standard Error t Ratio 
c 5.54 0.94 5.91 
c 
0t-1 -0.42 
0.10 4.10 
c 1t-1 0.05 
0.05 1.15 
DEM0 t -5.21 
1.67 3 .12 
Ee -0.14 0.22 0,66 t 
0i-1 0.04 0.10 0.45 
Ii-1 0.05 0.03 1.46 
DEMP t 1.20 
0.18 6.76 
Ep -0.25 0.26 0.96 t 
K 0.51 0,45 1.12 
VN -0,45 0.21 2.20 
* This equation also specified several dummy variables which registered the 
particular appropriations bill in which the agency was included. Maximum 
likelihood estmates associated with these dummies are not reported. 
n = 1230 
auxiliary statistics 
log likelihood 
percent correctly predicted 
goodness of fit statistics 
likelihood ratio index 
likelihood ratio statistic 
at convergence 
-556 .9 
78. 7 
0 .3468 
591.4 
-852 .6 
50,0 
Figure 1 
p (c) 
--- p 
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comments and criticisms. Jeff Dubin provided v aluable econometric 
adv ice, We also thank Dav id L�wery and Samuel Bookheimer for prov iding 
us with their budgetary data, and Eric Claus, David Fallek , and Marla 
Davison for research assistance . An earlier version of this paper was 
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presented at the 1984 meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Washington, D.C. This material is based upon work supported by the 
National Science Foundation under grant SES-8421 1 61 .  
1 .  To be sure, President Reagan ' s  successful veto o f  a continuing 
resolution in November 1 981 would seem to undermine this claim. The bill he 
vetoed, however, specified appropriations for the duration of the fiscal 
year. Although enacted under the rubric of a continuing resolution, it was 
tantamount to an omnibus appropriations bill. Notably , it was preceded by 
and was quickly followed by continuing resolutions that adhered to the Fenno 
Rule. These Reagan signed into law, 
2 . One might argue that the president has a credible veto threat even when 
P > X2 if his utility for c is greater than member 2 ' s utility for c 
(Congress and the president are engaged in a repeated th reat game. A key 
feature of the appropriations process, however, is that it is Congress who 
presents the president with a final "take it or leave it" choice between its 
bill b and the continuing resolution c. As long as P > x2 , he will prefer 
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X2 t o  c a t  the end o f  the fiscal year. When given the choice between b = x2 
and c ,  the president will choose b. Knowing this, the president ' s  threat to 
veto b = x 2 will not be credible . 
3 ,  Presidential influence will still be asymmetric when c > x2, This is 
sometimes the case. Farm commodity price supports, for example, revert to 
levels specified in the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act , which are much 
higher than existing levels . In such instances, however, the president 
derives influence from the veto only when P > .x 2, 
4. In six percent of the cases in our sample , ESTit = APPit ' We assigned 
these cases to the regime in which the president was in a strategically 
favorable position. Our model implies that if Congress actually preferred 
to appropriate less than the president ,  there would be no reason for them to 
come up t o  the figure the president requested, In contrast , the president 
could potentially pull congressional appropriations down to the figure he 
requested . This decision also turned out not to matter much, in that our 
findings survived intact when we re-estimated the equation after omitting 
the cases where ESTit = APPit ' 
s .  Although previous research in this a rea provides no suggestions as t o  
what time frame on the economic variables i s  appropriate, research on 
economic conditions and voting behavior has yielded considerable evidence 
that a) voters respond retrospectively to past conditions, and b) their 
memories tend to be quite short (Fair, 1978) , If congressmen a re like 
voters, the previous six months time frame dominates plausible alternatives , 
Whatever the case ,  considerable variation in the specification of the time 
frame of the economic variables had little affect upon the estimation 
results. 
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6.  The instrumental variables estimate of ESTit was created by imposing 
exc lusionary restrictions, i . e . , regressing them on the same exogenous 
variables that APPit was regressed on plus at least one additional variable, 
and using the fitted values in the equation. In this instance we actually 
specified several additional variables--dummy variables for the party of the 
president ,  for presidential election years, for war years ( The Korean 
Conflic t ,  FY1952-54, and Vietnam, FY1967-74) , and the unemployment and 
inflation rates during the six months prior to the president ' s  submission of 
the budget.  This model was thus strictly over-identified . Coefficients 
derived from estimating an equation very similar to this first-stage 
equation are reported in Kiewiet and Mccubbins ( 1985b) . The instrument we 
constructed for the OMB request in Equation 1 was only adequate, in that the 
correlation between our estimate and the actual value was only about 0 . 4.  
Estimation of Equation 1 with ordinary least squares, however, yielded 
results that are substantively equivalent to the instrumental results we 
report . 
7.  In previous analyses we used the percentage of Democrats in the House of 
Representatives. When floor figures were substituted for committee figures, 
however, the estimated coefficients were nearly identical. 
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